Companies Must Design Mechanisms to Cope With Unforeseen Disaster

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Like the rest of the world, we were horrified last year when more than 8,000 people died and another 20,000 were injured as the result of a gas leak at the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India. Unfortunately, that tragedy was not the first major corporate disaster in recent history.

Just more than two years ago, Johnson & Johnson recalled Tylenol capsules after seven people across the United States had died as a result of cyanide poisoning. And a few years before that, Procter & Gamble removed its Rely tampon product from the market after a new medical phenomenon, toxic shock syndrome, causing illness and death, was linked to its use.

While such tragedies are not easy to think about, they are not due solely to the acts of a few isolated madmen, faulty plant design or poor operator training. The real heart of the problem—and what Bhopal in particular has to teach us—is that corporate executives have neither been trained to think about such situations nor how to deal successfully with them. The question is why.

The strongest explanation we have found is that the ideas we inherited from the Industrial Revolution more than a century ago are now totally inappropriate for managing in today's world.

One of the most profound legacies of the Industrial Revolution was the mental map of the world that it firmly implanted in people's minds. This map consisted of the basic idea that in essence the world was nothing but a simple machine. Among the many nice properties of machines, one is especially critical: Machines can be easily broken down into their individual parts. Hence, if a machine is broken, it is a relatively simple matter to isolate and to replace the defective part.

This notion was virtually carried over into the design of all our social institutions and our attitudes toward solving complex problems. Thus, our institutions, largely bureaucratic, were designed in the image of a machine. Complex problems, such as people's jobs, were broken down into a large number of supposedly simple, independent tasks. Further, the technical aspects of problems were considered in isolation from the environmental, legal, moral and political aspects. This strategy, which worked so well in the past, is now failing miserably.

For instance, it's nearly impossible to comprehend what really happened in Bhopal without considering the simultaneous interaction of Union Carbide's corporate structure, its safety record, its social and political views of Third World countries, its safety technology and the innumerable assumptions that both the company and the Indian government made about another one.

What, then, can organizations do, and what is legitimate to expect of them?

First, managers need to change drastically some ingrained but unproductive patterns of reasoning. For instance, no one can forecast or prevent all tragedies. But all too many managers and corporations used this commonplace truism as an excuse for doing nothing. In the many frequent talks we've had with managers, we feel we've heard just about all the excuses for doing nothing. Complete prevention is impossible, or it's too costly, too consuming, etc. Every one of these reasons is true to an extent.

However, they all miss a fundamental point. While complete prevention of all tragedies is all but impossible, a systematic, comprehensive and sensible program designed to cope with them is not.

Very few corporations have had the foresight to think in the same way as did the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee before last year's Summer Games. Very few—almost none—take a total look at their corporation from a devil's advocate point of view—through the eyes of the terrorist or our psychopath. Very few call in experts and security management before a crisis has occurred to see how vulnerable they are to attacks, breakdowns and catastrophes of all kinds from the perspective of those who are not emotionally involved with their corporations.

Very few hold regular and repeated crisis-simulation workshops, exercises and training seminars to prepare their key executives to cope with the overwhelming myriad of tasks they will be called on to perform during the height of nervous breakdown and extreme anxiety. We know of almost no organizations that hold repeated brainstorming sessions that encourage their executives to come up with the most creative ideas they can for coping with all kinds of tragedies.

Unbelievably, even among those organizations that have already been hit by a tragedy, there are very few that have permanent, in-place, 24-hour crisis-management units that are prepared to think about every one of the kinds of crises that can occur.

No one expects or demands perfection from corporations. But one does have the right to ask the corporations to do the best they can to anticipate the worst—so that the unthinkable—before it happens. Can you imagine the people of Los Angeles—and the rest of the world, for that matter—allowing the Olympic Games to be held if L.A.O.C.C. had said, "Because we don't know the exact whereabouts of every terrorist, therefore we're going to do nothing to thwart terrorist activity."

It is perhaps understandable that before the poisoning of Tylenol, Johnson & Johnson had no permanent crisis-management unit in place. But the company should certainly have come now because it is dangerous to live with the fake rationalization that you can't predict all tragedies before they occur.

In the case of Bhopal, if Union Carbide is going to invoke sabotage as a possible explanation for what happened, then do we not also have a right to ask if they did everything in their power to think of alternatives beforehand? If not, why not?

Further still, did they design their plant not just from a technical standpoint, but from the standpoint of all-too-human operators having to perform during the worst crisis imaginable? Again, if not, why not?

Finally, the case of Relty tampons may be the most difficult and unanswerable of all. We need more assurance that corporations are testing their products more carefully. The trust between consumer and corporation has to be reestablished. It's been shaken repeatedly almost to the point of a total break.

Ultimately, the real lesson of these tragedies is that no one—however far removed from the home base of a corporation and seemingly insignificant—can be ignored. The world is not only a complex system that evolves—it is a globally complex system. Unless all corporations truly learn to think in global terms and begin to consider the impacts of all their actions on as many interest groups as possible, the next corporate disaster is just around the corner.

The new bottom line is: There is no place left for corporations to run to and hide their actions. We are more linked together than ever before in the history of the world. There are no isolated, simple parts anymore.